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2Readers may be bemused by this essay’s task – to present Niklas Luhmann to 
anthropologists as a potentially useful social theorist.  Those with even a passing 
acquaintance with Luhmann will recognize the multiple disciplinary ironies at the heart 
of this effort.  Luhmann, after all, chooses as his initial theoretical stance to remove the 
person as a conscious (or even unconscious) social actor from his systems theory.  In 
addition, in his framework, radical epistemological difference exists both as a 
commonplace internal to how systems function and without reference to anything that 
many anthropologists have learned to view as cultural.  What could there be in this 
system theorist’s analytical toolkit that could prove productive, especially to scholars 
whose training presumes that subjectivity and radical difference are essential to think 
with or against in one’s parsing of social contexts?
I suggest that it is precisely the ways in which Luhmann’s theory of social 
systems erases the person as an agent that can render Luhmann’s writings significant for 
anthropologists.   Many anthropologists are committed to addressing how selves and 
socialities can be formed through different epistemological assumptions.  Yet during 
fieldwork they are encountering interpenetrating systems in which different selves are 
distinctly not at stake.  The systems that people on the ground face are increasingly 
structured as systems that erase selves, and, especially if the systems are global, that erase 
the messy contours of cultural difference.  Economic flows, governmental networks, legal 
structures – all can be examined as colliding systems that create subject positions, but do 
not necessarily engage with subjects.  In addition, Luhmann offers a theoretical 
standpoint from which to think about radical difference without invoking radically 
different selves or relations, a perspective that might prove invaluable when exploring 
social systems that participants view as systems—such as bureaucracies or institutions. 
Systems Without Selves: Notes and Queries on Luhmann’s Systems Theory
Luhmann’s intellectual genealogy offers an intriguing starting point for imagining 
systems without selves—he begins at the intersection of Talcott Parsons1 and Gregory 
Bateson2.   To begin with Talcott Parsons is to begin with a commitment to thinking 
about social interactions as instantiations of systems.  Thus the first question to ask of any 
interaction is: to what system does this interaction belong?  From there, the analyst can 
explore how this particular system structures itself, and how the system relates to other 
systems.  In short, Parsons provides the impetus to frame society as an interwoven 
complex of smaller social systems, in which each system’s functioning contributes to 
how society operates as a whole.  
To begin with Bateson, however, shifts the focus in Luhmann’s writing away 
from Parsons’ more functionalist emphasis on how all interactions and subsystems are 
working as interdependent systems to produce society as a functioning whole.  Thus the 
question to ask of any interaction is not, as Parsons might wish: how does this interaction 
contribute to a functioning totality? On the contrary—Luhmann’s opening theoretical 
concern is with how systems distinguish themselves from their environment and from 
each other, creating contexts in which the ‘difference that makes a difference’ (Bateson, 
1972: 453) becomes the analytical key to understanding a given system.   It is useful to 
keep Bateson’s vision of cybernetic systems in mind when beginning to tackle 
Luhmann’s work, since both are far more concerned with understanding systems in terms 
3of communication and its binds than with interpreting systems in terms of functions and 
their failures.
How does Luhmann analyze systems and their communication without any 
concern for the people who might inhabit these systems?  From Luhmann’s perspective, 
this question fundamentally misrepresents the relationship between social systems and 
people.  The foundational divide is not between society and the individual, but between a 
system and its environment.  Systems constitute themselves by distinguishing what they
do from what occurs in their environment.  For systems to exist, the system itself must 
determine what is system and what is environment, not what is structure and what is 
agency.  Performing these distinctions is a self-constituting activity of systems, not 
people.  People are relevant to social systems only as part of the environment.  He 
describes people as psychic systems, and argues that psychic systems are bounded 
entities that can not communicate directly with each other or with social systems (see 
Luhmann 2002: 169-184).  People often will offer inputs into social systems, but these 
inputs are not the same thing as communication.  Thus, people provide material for a 
social system to re-frame according to the system’s needs, an activity no different than 
what any part of the environment contributes to its system.  In short, for Luhmann, to see 
systems in terms of selves is to misunderstand how systems function.
  A system constitutes itself as distinct from its environment according to principles 
particular to that system.  Every system requires an environment, it requires a background 
against which the system defines itself.   What is not part of the system is, from the 
system’s perspective, part of its environment.   A system can exist only by making 
constant distinctions between what it is versus what its environment is.  For example, the 
aesthetic system is constantly distinguishing between what is beautiful and what is ugly.  
Its very existence depends upon continually producing this distinction, on constantly 
asserting what is beautiful and what is not.  In the process, it is framing its environment 
as everything that waits to be coded as beautiful or ugly.  It is in this way that systems 
can only exist because they have an environment available to be processed.  Notice that 
the reverse is not true.  No environment requires a system to exist.3  
 These systems are autopoetic, that is, they are self-reproducing.  An autopoetic 
system is the product of its own processes and only its own processes.  Autopoesis is a 
term that Luhmann borrows from Maturana4, who originially coined the term to describe 
biological functions.  Luhmann animates autopoesis with social significance.  Social 
systems are autopoetic—they ‘create everything that they use as an element and thereby 
use recursively the elements that are already constituted in the system.’ (Luhmann, 
1995[1984]: 444).    Neither the environment nor other systems (which can only be part 
of the system’s environment) provides an autopoetic system with the tools to maintain 
itself—a system defines and maintains itself without any external structuring assistance.  
Thus, all observable activity occurs within systems, not within the environment.  
In addition, for a system to be autopoetic, the system must be able to observe 
itself.  Observation is how a system regulates the distinctions it is continuously making to 
determine what is system and what is environment.  This becomes apparent when one 
focuses on how the aforementioned aesthetic system perpetuates itself.  How beauty or 
ugliness is determined shifts over time, and largely depends on the object or 
performance’s ability to attract an observer. It is the act of observation that perpetuates 
the system.  For a system to understand which internal processes must be reproduced, and 
4which discarded, the system must be able to observe and judge its own functioning 
(Luhmann, 1995[1984]: 457).  For Luhmann, making a distinction is an act of 
observation, so the originary act through which a system births itself is by observing.  
Luhmann distinguishes between two levels of observation, calling the act of making a 
distinction a first-order observation.  Distinguishing between system and environment, or 
distinguishing whether something is right or wrong, legal or illegal, beautiful or ugly—all 
are first-order observations.  Observing this distinction—noticing the initial separation or 
categorization—is a second-order observation.  Thus systems are constantly performing 
first-order observations as they distinguish between system and environment.  They are 
also constantly performing second order observations as they monitor the processes 
which separate system from environment.5  Both types of observation occur according to 
the logic of the system in which the observations take place.   
Notice that these observations always occur within the context of a system.  There 
is no external observer in Luhmann’s framework.  This may seem counterintuitive, since 
Luhmann’s claims appear to be located in an external vantage point, an analytic position 
outside of the context of any system.   This is not the stance that Luhmann claims for 
himself.  For Luhmann, systems theory is an observation that occurs within the confines 
of society, it is one of society’s self-observations.  Indeed, all analyses, all observation 
according to Luhmann must occur from within a system.  Observing requires a system 
from which one can observe.  Thus to observe a system’s functioning from outside of the 
system can only occur by observing from within the context of another system.   In short, 
observing, or reflection, is possible only within the context of a system, and is 
structurally specific to the system in which it takes place.
 Every social system—legal, economic, educational, and so on—operates 
according to its own internal logic.    Luhmann argues that the logic is expressed through 
binary processes—a system evaluates every input that enters from its environment in 
terms of a binary code derived from its own particular logic.6  For example, the legal 
system distinguishes itself from its environment by processes that evaluate everything in 
terms of what is legal or illegal.  Luhmann writes: 
 The legal system functions wherever one works with the schema 
legal/illegal.  This schema serves to differentiate a specific kind of 
acquisition of information; it does not serve, at least not primarily, to find 
out anything about actions, to explain or to predict them.  When the legal 
treatment of problems was professionalized, the legal system enlisted 
terms like theory, knowledge, and science.  But cognitive efforts serve 
here only to create the preconditions for decision—those who make them 
take pride in doing precisely this and no more. (Luhmann, 1995 [1984]: 
374).   
Every element, every communication within a system is produced according to the 
principles that structure that particular system’s functioning.  
A system exists in a specific paradoxical relationship with its environment, since 
a system exists to expand, to ensure that it encodes as much as it can.  The environment 
both provides the sustenance, so to speak, for the system to continue functioning, and acts 
as the boundary which the system is constantly trying to exceed.  To be a system is to 
have a drive to envelop.  The environment from this perspective serves as constant fuel 
5and constant resistance.  Here Luhmann re-writes some familiar anthropological 
understandings of domination and resistance when he defines the relationship between a 
system and its environment in terms of order and its limits.  The resistance that 
environments proffer systems is a resistance emerging out of too much complexity, not 
an active resistance to a system’s urge to order.   
What keeps a system from enveloping its environment?  One of the basic 
divisions between a system and its environment is that a system is always far more 
ordered than its environment, and an environment is always far more complex than its 
system.   This distinction is fundamental to what systems and environments are for one 
another.  A system is constantly re-formulating the noise and chaotic complexities that 
leave the environment and enter the system into order.  But creating order is also always 
creating a simplification, it is reducing complexity to what is manageable.  The 
environment is, by its very nature, ‘everything else’, always far more complex than a 
system.  The boundary between the system and its environment emerges as a result of the 
amount of complexity that the particular system is capable of ordering.  The limit is the 
limit between a system’s order and an environment’s complexity.  This is a constantly 
shifting limit as the system changes its abilities to structure. 
This has an interesting implication for how systems relate to each other.  From a 
single system’s perspective, other systems are always part of the environment.  A system 
does not distinguish between input it receives from other systems and the environment.   
‘This means that the complexity each system makes available is an incomprehensible 
complexity—that is, disorder—for the receiving system.  Thus one could say that psychic 
systems supply social systems with adequate disorder and vice versa.’ (Luhmann, 1995 
[1984]: 214)  Other systems’ inputs are not received as pre-coded for that system’s use.  
The relationship between two systems is indistinguishable from the relationship between 
a system and its environment.  A system is always another systems’ environment.   
‘Everything that happens belongs to a system (or to many systems) and always at the 
same time to the environment of other systems.’ (Luhmann,1995 [1984]: 177, emphasis in 
original)  So when a change happens in a system, a change happens in the environment of 
all other systems.   
As a consequence, the relationship between systems is always a relationship 
balancing interdependency and encompassment.  Systems can depend upon each other in 
as much as systems can provide each other with palatable disorder, a disorder that is more 
easily digested.  Producing the appropriate disorder for another system is not, however, 
part of a system’s intention.   Systems might interact in ways that promote each others’ 
functioning, but a system never interacts in a way that takes into account the ways the 
other system functions.
Communicating across systems always generates a miscommunication because it 
involves re-contextualizing information.  This is a consequence of having autopoetic 
systems interacting with each other.  When a system exists only as the historical product 
of its own processes, then other systems can only contribute complexities or disorder that 
needs to be structured anew.  As a result, receiving systems invariably disregard why a 
particular output was generated, or entered into their boundaries--the principles driving 
the production and transmission of the information are radically different from those 
governing its reception.  These miscommunications have the potential of being 
productive, but not inevitably so.   The relationship between systems is not simply about 
6circulating more and more easily re-formulated complexities.  Every system also tries to 
expand into every other system, re-encoding its functions to operate according to that 
system’s interests.  When there are temporarily stable boundaries (and this occurs often), 
this stability is always a hard-won achievement.  (Luhmann, 1990: 74).  
Luhmann’s theory presupposes radical epistemological difference as a 
commonplace, an inevitable component of how systems operate.   Because systems are 
autopoetic, their logics are self-contained.  The system doesn’t allow other logics or 
principles to exist within its confines.  In this sense, Luhmann’s theory of distinction is 
one of radical distinction--logics are not mutually accessible to each other.   He does 
acknowledge that a system can perceive another system as a set of processes operating 
according to alternate principles – systems can recognize that other possibilities, other 
ways of being autopoetic can exist.  But from a system’s perspective, the other systems 
are inferior.  He writes: 
Every system that participates in interpenetration realizes the other within itself as the 
other’s difference between system and environment, without destroying its own 
system/environment difference.  Thus every system can actualize its own superiority in 
complexity, its own modes of description, and its own reductions in relation to the other 
and thus make its own complexity available to the other. (Luhmann, 1995 [1984]: 217)
  
In this passage, Luhmann points to the ways in which systems acknowledge the 
possibilities that other ways of dividing the world can exist.  He claims that systems can 
even recognize that they are another system’s environment.  Yet this recognition of 
otherness does not reduce or weaken a system.7  For a system, the perception of other 
systems is seen only in the context of the perceiving system’s superiority.8  
Unbridgeable difference is thus the norm for Luhmann.  Systems can be viewed as 
perspectives which can never be inhabited simultaneously, a separation created by how 
systems fashion themselves.
Luhmann describes society as functionally differentiated, a conglomeration of 
interdependent systems.  Each social system is a subset of society, and as such, 
contributes to how society operates as a totality.  This totality is based on connections 
built upon miscommunications, it is a confederacy of irreconcilable perspectives.  Society 
is made up of interacting but autonomous social systems.  Luhmann describes society as 
a system, but it is a system that can not behave in the same fashion that its internal social 
systems can.  Because of the rifts already described that lie at the heart of society’s 
functional differentiation, society does not resemble its own systems in two significant 
ways.  First, society can not observe itself—there is no external unifying position from 
which one can observe.  ‘Society remains the same but appears as different depending 
upon the functional subsystem (politics, economy, science, mass media, education, 
religion, art, and so on) that describes it.’ (Luhmann, 2002: 89) Society has become riven 
by self-referential systems, each defined solely by their own techniques for responding to 
and incorporating complexity.  These divisions between systems ensure society can not 
exist as a unity observing itself.   Luhmann sees this as an historical development, 
arguing that there was a moment when society was a totality that could observe itself.9  
Secondly, there is no social system lying outside of society.  By this, I mean that 
society has no social systems in its environment.  Society can have other systems in its 
environment—psychic, biological, and so on.  But society encompasses all social 
7systems.  This has several important implications.  In Luhmann’s account, society, and by 
implication all social systems, exist at a global level.  Spatial boundaries have no 
significance in Luhmann’s framework.  There are no individual societies competing with 
each other, divided by national boundaries.  Neither society nor social subsystems--such 
as economic, scientific or media systems--have geographical limits.  There may be 
regional differences in the ways that particular systems are configured, but these regional 
differences are variants of a larger social system. Luhmann argues that: 
In our context, where we have to decide between assuming a global system of regional 
societies or a world society, we have now clear and theoretically consistent arguments for 
a single world society. The autopoietic system of this society can be described without 
any reference to regional particularities. This certainly does not mean that these 
differences are of minor importance. But a sociological theory that wants to explain these 
differences, should not introduce them as givens, that is, as independent variables; it 
should rather start with the assumption of a world society and then investigate, how and 
why this society tends to maintain or even increase regional inequalities. (Luhmann, 
1997: 11)
 In short, Luhmann suggests that society is best thought of as a global unity that is 
internally differentiated, rather than as a conglomeration of distinct entities that are linked 
through emerging flows of communication, knowledge, and resources.  
In describing society as global, Luhmann also posits that society has a different 
balance with its environment than its subsystems have.  Social systems must constantly 
guard their boundaries—other social systems constantly want to encompass the social 
systems in their environment.  Society is not faced with the same threat.  In this sense, 
society’s relationship with its environment is more placid than social systems’.
Luhmann’s focus on systems and their environment instead of agents and their 
social orders offers new analytical tools for exploring the contexts anthropologists’ 
interlocutors regularly navigate.  He offers an approach that enables scholars to 
conceptualize anew radical difference, agency, resistance, global/local dichotomies, and 
reflexivity.  Radical difference is no longer the purview of culture, but a commonplace 
and pervasive by-product of how society constitutes itself.  Agency is no longer located 
in the person, but is now a quality most readily understood to be part of systems.  
Resistance is no longer a performance of agency, but is now central to how systems and 
environments exist.  The global/local divisions can no longer be framed as global systems 
interacting with local societies, thus sidestepping the paradoxes other scholars have 
commented upon in critiquing the global/local dichotomy (Appadurai, 1996; Inda and 
Rosaldo, eds. 2001; Strathern, ed., 1995).  Finally, reflexivity is no longer linked to 
consciousness, but is fundamental to how systems constitute themselves.  In short, 
Luhmann offers an analytical toolkit filled with double-edged instruments for 
anthropologists to use.
Anthropological Uses of Luhmann’s Systems Theory: 
Reading With and Against Luhmann 
Only a handful of anthropologists have found Luhmann useful to date, and each 
one has found quite different aspects of Luhmann’s system theory provocative and 
promising.  In this section, I discuss how Luhmann might prove useful to some 
8anthropological projects, albeit with some reservations.  I also address some of the ways 
in which anthropologists have already incorporated Luhmann’s interventions in their own 
work.  
I am ambivalent about Luhmann’s theory.  I find his account of systems without 
selves useful as an analytic but unbearable when lived.  Luhmann provides an analytical 
toolkit to think about the systems that my interlocutors in the field, Samoan migrants in 
New Zealand and the United States, encountered on a regular basis.  They were 
constantly attempting to navigate bureaucracies which operated along contradictory yet 
all-encompassing principles, principles that often erased the nuanced ways in which my 
interlocutors tried to fashion themselves in these encounters into effective social 
strategists.  The people who acted as representatives of the systems localized by these 
bureaucracies also were quite ambivalent about their allegiances, distancing themselves 
verbally from the systems that they were practicing.  In short, Luhmann offers a rigorous 
method for thinking about the systems that people are constantly encountering, and for 
discussing the often paradoxical ways in which people understand and practice their 
relationships to these systems.  What I am suggesting is that Luhmann’s theoretical 
model is useful not because of his nuanced insights into social interactions, but because 
of his nuanced insights into social systems.  He is not capturing sociality well, but he is 
depicting systems profitably.  And for anthropologists, this presents a quite engaging 
challenge.   How can we as ethnographers make use of Luhmann’s insights into systems 
to understand better how our interlocutors in the field experience and analyze their 
relationships to social orders--social orders that often, but not always, are constituted as 
systems?  I am suggesting that Luhmann is useful to anthropologists because he offers a 
framework for thinking about systems without selves, leaving anthropologists (and our 
interlocutors who encounter such systems) the difficult task of reading selves back into 
the interactions.
What would Luhmann’s systems look like to people on the ground?  In this 
section, I focus on the anthropological implications of two aspects of Luhmann’s system 
theory.  First, I explore how people might experience the tense relationships between 
systems that are central to how systems interact with each other.  Second, I discuss what 
culture or allegiances to social orders not structured as systems might seem like from a 
system theory’s perspective.  In short, I am asking how anthropologists might engage 
with systems theory without losing sight of people or of more anthropologically familiar 
understandings of epistemological differences.
People might experience how systems differentiate themselves in several ways.  
People will experience bureaucracies and/or systems as often mutually incompatible.  
This incompatibility will range from contradictions surrounding basic terms or definitions 
to Catch-22s where people are thwarted from moving between systems successfully.  In 
thinking about definitional incompatibilities I am referring to how exclusive and 
irreconcilable categories can be when compared across systems.  What family means 
from the perspective of the economic system –a unit of measurement such as a 
household--is different than what family means in the legal system—a path towards 
legitimating inheritance, or a source of conflict to be sorted.   Even when terms appear to 
share similar referents, the ways systems function will guarantee that they don’t. 
The dilemma this engenders occurs on more than a definitional level.  Each 
system structures the subject positions that people can inhabit differently, forcing people 
9to learn a wide range of social strategies, each set compatible with a different system.  
The skills required to be a successful businessman are different than the skills required to 
be a successful parent or president of the local synagogue.  What becomes increasingly 
rewarded as people move across systems are the skills required to see oneself as relating 
to one system among many.  In short, as people move between systems, they will be 
rewarded for abilities to recognize and learn more quickly from strategic failures (such as 
recognizing systems’ incompatibilities) as well as learning how to respond most 
effectively to the principles of a single system.
When people are operating as social strategists from within a system, rather than 
trying to navigate several, a different dynamic is at stake.  While systems in practice are 
constantly differentiating themselves, systems often represent themselves as requiring 
increasing centralization.  Centralization and its corollary--more effective 
communication—can be many systems’ favorite chimera.  Centralization is a system’s 
dream of increasing control.  Every system desires to expand and encompass as much of 
its environment (and thus other social systems) as possible.   Increasingly efficient 
communication is a system’s way of hoping to code more and more of its environment.  
Noise is a significant way that systems experience their own boundaries, boundaries that 
are overcome through more and more effective re-codings.  Readers who research 
bureaucracies and institutions might recognize these calls for centralization and more 
efficient communication (in my fieldwork among New Zealand and United States welfare 
officers this was expressed as plans for a ‘one-stop shop’ in almost every context).  After 
all, a system will recognize its own failures initially in terms of ever more inefficient 
communication.
I want to point out that centralization and efficient communication may always be 
imagined to be on the horizon, but are rarely achieved.  Often these are efforts that in 
practice are meant to unite different systems tightly.  This is a hazardous endeavor from 
the perspective of any system—they risk being overtaken by another system.  So while 
centralization may be an often proclaimed goal, in practice all sorts of obstacles will 
emerge to undercut this process.  Systems theory presents a context for explaining both 
the calls for centralization and efficiency, and the many interactions that ensure these 
goals will rarely be realized.
Centralization is but one of the ways in which systems attempt to re-formulate 
other systems.  Luhmann points out that the boundaries between systems emerge as side 
effects of the ways in which systems attempt to reach their goals, that the very 
functioning of the system creates the differentiation.  In short, the radically different 
raison d’etre determining each system helps ensure that communication between the two 
systems is miscommunication.  It is possible for people engaging with these systems to 
misinterpret these boundaries, to view them as obstacles rather than enforcing separations 
that create the spaces that support productive functioning.  When the boundaries are 
misinterpreted from the political system’s perspective, the political system attempts to 
expand through bureaucratization.  This increase in administration is misplaced, since it 
is creating political order in domains where success can not be achieved in the ways that 
the political system usually creates order, that is, by producing binding decisions 
(Luhmann, 1990: 75-76).  For example, when social workers try to help families create a 
plan of recovery, in which they schedule the changes they will make each week or each 
month, the social workers are supposing that families are functional when they are self-
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referentially ‘managed’ in much the same way that government agencies are.  The social 
workers are teaching families how to be functional from a political system’s perspective.  
They are co-opting the family system, and attempting to replace its unique principles of 
how information and resources should circulate with political principles.  Part of the 
dynamic underpinning government aid to families is this spread of bureaucratization.   By 
providing resources, the political system encroaches upon the family system, justifying 
its own existence at the same time as it attempts to re-make the family in its own image.
Marilyn Strathern (in press) points to a similar dynamic of encompassment and 
re-structured reflexivity in her discussion of auditing as a Luhmannian system.  She 
discusses how organizations function as the constantly perturbing environment for the 
auditing system, providing data that needs to be re-packaged by the audit.   In this case, 
health service trusts or university departments are perceived by the auditing system as 
other systems, but systems that must be explicit about their functioning along the lines 
that the audit requires.  What audit demands is that other systems become second-order 
observers of their own functioning according to the auditing system’s principles, not 
according to their own.  Their inevitable failures are transformed both into the audit’s 
legitimation and a justification for its perpetual and insatiable quest for better tools of 
measurement. She writes: 
I said that a frequent complaint made of audit is that it fails to comprehend the 
‘complexity’ of the organizations it monitors.  Of course: as itself a system, audit’s 
complexity lies in its own internal mechanisms of conduct.  These it ‘improves’ by 
sucking complexity out of the external organizations into itself. (Strathern in press) 
Audit functions precisely because of the contradictions between how it models the ways 
organizations should function and how organizations model their own functioning.   
Reflexivity (or self-description) is not only structured along different lines by each 
system, but can also become the lever by which one system attempts to encompass 
another.
Strathern’s use of Luhmann to account for the pitfalls at the heart of the audit also 
sheds light on other inter-system transactions. Sometimes anthropologists who research 
and work in NGOs have at some point or another had that sinking feeling that these 
NGOs have been set up to fail.  Luhmann offers a theoretical explanation affirming this 
suspicion.  From a political system’s perspective, NGOs often play a specific part in 
perpetuating the political system.  They must create a very particular disorder, one which 
the government bureaucracy can co-opt for its own purposes.  What these organizations 
often produce, at the most literal level, for the political system are reports–reports written 
according to the political system’s specifications–about the clients they have been funded 
to assist.  The political system can transform these reports into tools of legitimation, the 
reports act as evidence and fuel for all-important statistics.  Because of the ways in which 
government bureaucracies are set-up to collect this information, they have less leeway to 
fabricate than the community-based organizations do.  And the community-based 
organizations have enormous, albeit implicit, pressure exerted on them by the political 
system to shape their reports according to the political system’s needs.  The political 
system shapes the pragmatic norms of how community based organizations can survive 
financially.  By doing so, the political system also co-opts the ways in which these 
community-based organizations can break the rules.  The government system is quite 
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effective at co-opting the pragmatic norms of how to fudge in this system–the  
community workers are often fashioning, however unwittingly, the disorder that the 
political system requires, not the disorder that their clients might find useful.10
I am suggesting that social orders in general, and systems in particular, need to be 
understood in terms of the social strategies they enable.  It is as important to understand 
how people envision their relationship to a social system as it is to understand how a 
social system functions.  Thus the question I have been asking in the past section has 
been: how do people understand their relationships to social systems, assuming that 
Luhmann has useful insights into how systems function?   The question I have been 
posing in Luhmannian terms is: how do psychic systems perceive and understand their 
interactions with social systems?  Yet framed this way, the question erases one of my 
central concerns.  If systems function as Luhmann suggests, how do people move 
between systems?  Luhmann has engaging discussions of how information or resources 
move across or between systems.  But this begs the question of how people traverse 
systems, which they must do in the course of daily life.  This is one of the ethnographic 
puzzles that Luhmann leaves anthropologists with – how to understand people’s relations 
not just to a social order or system, but to the wide range of incompatible systems they 
engage with on a daily basis.
Configurations of Risk
I turn now to other instances in which anthropologists might find the tension  
between Luhmannian systems and how people on the ground fashion themselves as 
strategists productive, turning in particular to his dichotomy between danger and risk.  
Several anthropologists have found Luhmann’s distinctions between danger and risk 
useful when analyzing people’s conceptualizations of their relationships to nature or to 
others (Tim Ingold, 1992; Dan Rabinowitz, 1992; Stephen Collier, Andrew Lakoff, Paul 
Rabinow in press).  Luhmann defines danger as an external force, one that emerges from 
outside of one’s systems, networks or social contexts.  Because danger enters from the 
environment, it is uncontrollable.  One’s actions have no effect on whether danger will 
exist or not.  Risk, on the other hand, is a threat produced within a system; one’s actions 
can allow the risk to come to fruition.  At the heart of Luhmann’s distinction between 
danger and risk is the question of how one imagines the relationship between 
responsibility and contingency.  In a situation of danger, people are not responsible for 
any possible threat or disruption.  In the case of risk, people are imagining that a wide 
range of contingencies are linked to their actions.  Risk entails one’s own involvement in 
cause and effect--possibilities are viewed as the outcome of strategies, and hence 
controllable.  
Anthropologists have put this dichotomy to good effect, although often without 
adopting wholesale Luhmann’s approach to systems.  Ingold discusses how hunter-
gatherers might understand their relationship to nature as risk instead of danger, seeing 
themselves as embedded in a network of relationships with non-human agencies.  He 
suggests that seeing nature in terms of danger—as a source of uncontrollable and external 
hazards—is a Western stance that misinterprets how hunter-gatherers operate (Ingold, 
1992: 41-42).  To put this in Luhmannian terms, hunter-gatherers do not see themselves 
as operating from within a system with Nature serving as an external environment.  To be 
embedded within nature affects both their practices and what they consider social.  In a 
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sense, Ingold is focusing on how to apply the danger/risk dichotomy to a first-order 
observation made by hunter-gatherers, he is focusing on the ways hunter-gatherers 
fashion the preliminary divide with their environment.
Rabinowitz uses the danger/risk dichotomy to describe how Israelis view Arabs.  
With this move, he is employing the danger/risk dichotomy to understand a second-order 
observation.  He is not as concerned with how Israelis understand their own social 
strategies (potentially a first-order observation) as he is with how Israelis understand 
Arabs as social strategists, a second-order observation.  He wants to understand how a 
person views the distinctions they think others make.  He asks: what kind of rationales do 
Israelis attribute to Arabs as others, and then, how do these explanations recursively 
shape Israeli practices?  He argues that Israelis tend to see Arabs more as dangers than as 
risks—as a person with an irrational destructive drive towards Israelis.  This is not always 
the case, and there are times that the pendulum will swing towards risk—an Israeli will 
view an Arab as acting out of rational self-interest.  He argues that Israelis are constantly 
ascertaining where Arabs fall on a continuum of dangerous or risky motivations—are 
they operating from a cosmological malice or are they acting out of a technological and 
hence rational interest? (Rabinowitz, 1992: 531)    In short, for Rabinowitz, Luhmann’s 
concept of risk enables a discussion of the fluid yet limited ways in which people will 
ascribe motivations to others.
Collier, Lakoff, and Rabinow use Luhmann’s distinction to address the 
consequences of framing biosecurity only in terms of risk, and not in terms of danger.  
They argue that current frameworks for determining biosecurity recognize that the threats 
are the result of human action, and hence can be managed from within a technologizing 
framework.   Yet the origin of the threat is unknown, no one can predict which group will 
attack using biological weapons, or which weapons they will use.  This uncertainty 
creates the puzzle—how do experts construct apparatuses to respond to biosecurity 
threats when the nature of the threat is so indeterminable.  This instability at the core of 
how people conceptualize biosecurity hazards contributes to a Rashomon effect.  
Biosecurity experts have trouble agreeing about the object of their concern.  ‘In other 
words, there may be as many “threats” as there are domains of expertise.  This implies 
that a key task for our analysis is to note the different ways that the bioterrorism threat is 
constituted by various kinds of experts.’ (Collier, Lakoff and Rabinow, forthcoming)  
These experts face interconnected dilemmas, the ways in which biosecurity hazards are 
both danger and risk in Luhmannian terms also ensure that no one agrees on the nature of 
the threat.  The work of being a biosecurity expert is to navigate this infinite proliferation 
of threats through technologizing frameworks, attempting to create manageable 
uncertainties.
Systems and Their Vantage points
Other theorists have found thinking through Luhmann’s framework to be 
productive without asking the question: how does a Luhmannian system look from the 
perspective of the people who encounter it?  Luhmann offers a caution to scholars 
concerned with how social systems are instantiated in local contexts.  Systems by their 
nature claim a universalizing perspective that is continually undercut by their practice.  
They are interdependent with other systems, but this must be overlooked during a 
system’s self-referential observations.  Sari Wastell puts this caution to good effect in her 
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critique of legal pluralism (2001), and, by extension, of cultural pluralism.  Wastell
begins by pointing out that systems which claim to have a global purchase—legal 
systems, economic systems, and so on—all presuppose a God’s eye view.  This God’s 
eye view is structured differently depending on the system that presupposes it.  Local 
versions of these systems are seen as lesser, as imperfect and limited variants of this 
overarching vantage point.  In as much as these local variants represent a diversity—be it 
legal or cultural—it is one constructed out of an implicit juxtaposition with the global or 
universal envisioned in the system’s self-representation.
To say that legal or cultural pluralism presupposes a diversity that is always 
already essentialised and inferior is not a new critique (see also Greenhouse 1996).  What 
Luhmann enables Wastell to argue is that the problem is not in the diversity but the 
vantage point from which the particular form of diversity is conjured.  Just as systems 
create their own uniquely structured God’s eye view, so too do they create their own 
diversities.  But as Wastell points out (2001: 188), not every system produces a visible 
diversity.  She argues that systems which produce a diversity must do so by presupposing 
a God’s eye view against which the plurality is defined.  But systems that don’t do so are 
continually striving to formulate a unity or unified meaning, an effort which can only 
occur ‘against a myriad of redundant possibilities’ (Wastell, 2001: 188).  It is these 
systems, the ones that do not foreground plurality, that might offer useful ethnographic 
counterpoints to some of the paradoxes that anthropologists continually recreate as they 
engage with systems that presuppose diversity.  Wastell suggests that the way out of the 
conundrums pluralisms pose to anthropologists is not only by seeing how various systems 
structure diversities differently, and structure these diversities as specific types of 
problems to be resolved (see Greenhouse 1998).  She also suggests that ethnographic 
alternatives, studying systems where diversity is not at stake, will sharpen our analytical 
tools.
While Wastell focuses on how systems, in creating certain distinctions, produce a 
controllable diversity11, other anthropologists have found Luhmann helpful in his focus 
on the ways in which systems must address the uncontrollable.  Stephen Collier in 
particular has turned to Luhmann to frame his exploration of how futures are constructed 
from the vantage point of a system.  Collier takes as his case study the ways in which 
Soviets planned cities.  He argues that in the Soviet era, futures were predictable.  By 
viewing the future as certain, systems were taking what might be understood to be 
environment as already successfully structured.  He writes: ‘The pathology of certainty in 
Soviet planning, oriented to a future known in advance, in which questions of value had 
been fixed by bio-technical norms and industrial planning, was, as everyone knows, that 
it was the wrong future.’ (Collier, 2001: 339)    The neoliberalism that has replaced this 
Soviet certainty posits a far more tenable approach to the future, according to Collier.  
For him, neoliberalism recognizes the fundamental uncertainty of the future.  In short, 
neoliberalism takes into account the fundamental paradox that systems can never fully 
encompass or encode their environment.  For Collier, operating with an awareness of this 
paradox renders neoliberalism a more functional system. 
A System Theorist’s View of Culture
Anthropologists have started using Luhmann’s system theory to address how 
systems engender radically different subject positions, and thus how the everyday can be 
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experienced as epistemologically hybrid from context to context.   To locate 
epistemological differences in systems while belonging to a discipline founded in part on 
studying culture raises an important question: what does culture look like from the 
perspective of systems theory?  This is not a concern with how other systems’ radical 
difference might appear from a system’s perspective.  As I have already discussed, 
systems can recognize other system/environment divides—they can recognize that other 
systems can function along similar lines without losing sight of the system’s own 
superiority.  Asking about culture from a system’s perspective is asking about how 
systems perceive the possibility of radical epistemological difference not founded in a 
system/environment divide.  
In his essay, ‘The Ecology of Ignorance’ Luhmann begins to address this 
question, describing culture as a resource for dealing with the paradoxes that inevitably 
accompany systems.  He argues that the concept of culture begins with a double-edged 
cut.  First, culture implies a cultural relativism, the existence of one culture implies the 
existence of other cultures.  Note that for Luhmann the same does not hold true for 
society.  The concept of culture promises externally located epistemological difference, 
while for Luhmann, the concept of society references only internally located social 
differences.   Implying other cultural perspectives is not the only distinction culture’s 
existence asserts.  With culture also comes the possibility of non-culture, the possibility 
of boundaries or limits that culture’s a-systemic nature renders paradoxical.  In short, 
culture is not a system.   The concept of culture implies relationships between what 
culture is and what culture is not that are antithetical to how a system distinguishes itself 
from its environment.
Luhmann finds the ways that culture fashions boundaries problematic for several 
reasons.  First, culture is an endlessly divisible category, with no clear processes 
structuring these infinitely receding/shrinking divisions.  American culture can contain 
youth culture, drug culture, black culture, all with no clear techniques for determining 
how these cultures might overlap or distinguish themselves from each other.  Culture may 
presume distinctions in its originary moment, but does not sustain distinctions effectively 
afterwards.  Luhmann thus finds culture’s inability to have boundaries ‘at the bottom’ 
(Luhmann, 1998: 101) liberating in all the wrong ways, offering a promiscuous freedom 
from definition.  
This promiscuous freedom to exceed definition emerges in culture’s orientation to 
its topmost limit as well.  Luhmann is concerned with those moments when people know 
that they have a culture, when cultural identity is consciously fashioned.   In these 
moments, culture refers to a median, the average way of living in a particular context.  
Because culture is the average lifestyle, it also engenders the possibility of alternative 
lifestyles – the subcultures previously mentioned.  Culture legitimates internal 
distinctions in such a way that there is a constant tension between the standardization of 
tastes or of lifestyles and an impulse to individualize.  In addition, culture offers the 
possibility to be an individual through conformity to lifestyles that are distinctive only 
because they are not the norm.  The differences alternative cultures present are not radical 
ones.  People don’t necessarily have to have different concepts of the self or different 
concepts of sociality when they have an alternative lifestyle.  From a system theory’s 
perspective, the difference produced by subcultures is an empty one—a difference 
formed by being marked as different only, not enacted as such.  
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Culture becomes a particularly treacherous analytic concept from Luhmann’s 
perspective.  It becomes a vehicle for asserting distinction but not producing stable 
distinctions.  In this way, culture becomes an ideal medium for addressing paradoxes 
from the vantage point of second-hand observers (that is, observers who observe 
distinctions) without stably resolving them.  Culture is an arena for articulating ideology 
without necessarily engaging in practice, rendering it an ideal medium for simultaneously 
discussing and maintaining paradoxes.  At his most scathing, Luhmann states  ‘Culture is 
the stock market where options for paradox resolution are traded.’ (Luhmann, 1998: 102).  
What does this view of culture refracted through systems theory open up for 
anthropologists?  First, this stance provides a framework for understanding the ways in 
which cultural miscommunications or cultural conflicts are approached by people 
enmeshed in systems.  In contexts where people see others as the culture-bearers, culture 
is all too often invoked as an explanation for communicative failures, either between 
systems or between people.  Culture is the catch-all explanation formulated after failure, 
not prior to failure.  From within systems, people will tend to interpret differences as 
cultural after a failure in communication or compliance with the system performed by 
people outside of the system.  In these instances, often those who enact the system will 
see themselves as acultural, with others as the culture bearers.  This often implies 
invoking culture as a static category for classifying people.  Among people who see 
themselves as belonging to a culture instead of a system, often what they understand to be 
culture is far more fluid.  People will use the concept of culture not only as an 
explanation for failure but as a way of imagining why people act the ways that they do, to 
re-align what it means to be responsible for particular actions, and to understand why 
relationships are unfolding in the ways that they are (that is, not necessarily solely as 
explanations for failure, but also as explanations of process).  By treating culture as a 
static and reified category, and cultural difference as a homogenous heterogeneity, those 
within systems manage to 1) help perpetuate the illusion that culture and system are 
distinct entities; and 2) often imagine that system-wielders can save culture-bearers.   I 
also want to suggest that systems often benefit from the disconnection between the ways 
in which people within a system invoke culture and the ways in which those outside the 
system invoke culture.
Secondly, culture loses the analytical purchase that anthropologists have 
historically found in the concept.  For me, this loss is most apparent when Luhmann 
writes: ‘Culture sees itself as a culture of individuals, but this also implies that 
individuals must correspondingly discipline themselves’ (Luhmann, 1998: 101).  Culture 
in this formulation loses its epistemological promise to imagine alternative ways of 
having selves, of having complex patterns12 for circulating knowledge and resources that 
create different subjects as well as subject positions.  In sum, culture loses its originary 
promise made under Luhmann’s framework—the promise of other cultures, of other 
epistemologies.  Culture becomes a marker for empty identities.  It becomes possible to 
discuss cultural identity without concern about whether these identities point to different 
perspectives.   By invoking cultural identity as such a rubric, it becomes relatively easy to 
substitute a fill-in-the-blank-with-group’s-name notion of identity for the cultural 
specificity created by analyses conducted at the intersection of social organization and 
epistemological perspectives. In short, cultural differences and their epistemological edge 
are lost when one views social interactions only from the perspective of systems.
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Conclusion
Luhmann offers an analytically rigorous perspective for thinking with and against 
systems.  He writes against many of the disciplinary pleasures that anthropology has to 
offer.  This offers a challenge to anthropology that ethnographers who wish to do so can 
turn to their advantage.  After all, the systems anthropologists and our interlocutors on the 
ground regularly encounter often undercut many of the pleasures of thinking and 
practicing cultural difference as well, but do so without providing such an analytically 
rigorous framework detailing how this is accomplished.  I am encouraging 
anthropologists to have a complicated engagement with Luhmann’s system theory, 
viewing it as a productive foil for those who wish to explore the intersection between 
systems, epistemologies and social organization.  This may require an unfamiliar 
relationship to a theorist since it entails engaging with a theoretical perspective as a
possibility that people struggle with and try to undercut in their daily lives.  Luhmann is 
interesting precisely because he may be right about systems, but wrong about what it 
means to be a social being.  
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1 Luhmann studied under Talcott Parsons at Harvard in 1961.
2 I am attributing to Gregory Bateson more influence than perhaps Luhmann himself would acknowledge in 
an attempt to place Luhmann’s work in a context anthropologists might find more familiar.  See Social 
Systems, pp. 38-39 and  p. 39 ft. 75 for some further textual justification.
3 Notice also that distinction or difference only exists after the initial and initializing moment when a 
system distinguishes itself from its environment.
4 Humberto Maturana is a biologist who defined the nervous system as autonomous and self-referential—
any information the nervous system receives is re-coded by the nervous system. Thus, and importantly for 
Luhmann, a living system has no direct access to its environment.
5 After the first-order observation, observations operate recursively and are all structured along the same 
lines.  A second-order observation entails observing a distinction.  One could have a third-order 
observation, observing the distinction created by the second-order observation, and so on.  But the nature of 
the observation does not substantively change – from a second-order observation until a 917th observation, 
the observation itself is always simply observing a distinction.
6  I find Luhmann’s insistence that systems code according to a binary logic a bit simplistic.  When I try to 
understand how systems might be seen as coding and re-coding in my own fieldwork, I view the codings as 
occurring according to more intricate logics than either-or statements.
7 As I will discuss later, Marilyn Strathern offers an ethnographic example of this in her discussion of how 
audits engage with the organizations they evaluate (see Strathern in press).  
8 It is possible that this ability to perceive other systems, and other systems’ distinctions, is not a part of all 
systems.  This may well be a capacity that some systems have, and others do not.  My thanks to Sari 
Wastell for pointing out this nuance.
9  I came close to discarding Luhmann entirely when I first read his historical description of how society 
evolves from a self-referential totality to a totality split by functional differentiation.  (Luhmann 1990)  His 
romanticization of a pre-modern era when society was unified seemed too Eurocentric and naïve.
10  See Annelise Riles (2001: 175-178) for a parallel tension in how political activists can clash with a 
system, which she labels the Network.
11 See Erlmann (1994: 166-167) for a discussion of how infinite internal differentiation can also be used 
effectively to analyze world music.
12  In speaking for culture’s originary promise, I am not recommending that anthropologists valorize culture 
as a fount of stabilized meanings in contrast to systems’ conglomeration of incommensurabilities.  Sociality 
in its many forms may also be dependent on the inaccessibility of other minds and productive 
misunderstandings.  My thanks to my anonymous reviewer for this intervention.
